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2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy
comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh of
relief from paternal responsibility. The later words can be taken as a
comment on the naivete of the original of an earlier day, [and] as a
rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness of street life and the
debasement that it signifies.1
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., Justice Souter, writing for the
Supreme Court, perceived 2 Live Crew’s rap song based on Roy Orbison’s
“Oh, Pretty Woman” as a parody.2 2 Live Crew’s “Pretty Woman” starts,
like the original, with appreciation for a pretty woman but quickly switches
to condemning a “big hairy,” “bald headed,” and “two-timin’” woman.3
According to Justice Souter, by twisting the words (and music), the later
song made the original seem foolish and fantastic.4 But what makes street
*

Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. This paper benefited from
comments by Amy Adler, Ann Bartow, Stephen Burt, Julie Cohen, Francesca Coppa,
Rochelle Dreyfuss, Sonia Katyal, Zachary Schrag, and participants in the 2006 conference
on IP/Gender: The Unmapped Connections sponsored by the Glushko-Samuelson
Intellectual Property Law Clinic at the Washington College of Law.
1. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 595-96.
4. Id. at 583.
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life ugly and debased? Apparently, it is the presence of an ugly and
debased woman. Making fun of a song about a man’s romantic musings, it
turns out, requires making fun of the woman described therein.
This pattern is not unique in copyright fair use disputes. Both parodies
and legal opinions reflect the culture from which they come, and our
culture has many anxieties about sexuality and women’s bodies. This
article explores the ways in which these anxieties play out in fair use cases.
Part I addresses situations in which fair use cases turn on whether
sexualizing a particular work is transformative; these days the answer is
often “yes.”5 Comparing sexual fair use cases in which defendants win to
nonsexual fair use cases in which plaintiffs prevail, this Part argues that
sexualization should not be a type of reworking that deserves de facto
special fair use protection. Rather, courts should consider sexualization as
one of many things that creative reworkings could add to, or take away
from, an original.
Part II takes up the published/unpublished distinction courts apply as
part of the second statutory fair use factor and connects it to ideas of
privacy that feminist scholars have critiqued. The case law links
publication and exposure to reinterpretation. This Part suggests that
freedom of interpretation would be furthered by looking outside the four
corners of a work to see if what has been kept private would further public
discourse.
Part III analyzes market rhetoric in fair use cases. Part III-A discusses
how courts use the presence of overt sexuality in a work to define markets
within and without the copyright owner’s control when analyzing the
fourth fair use factor of whether the defendant’s use harms the plaintiff’s
legitimate market. Current corporate practices and pornographers’ infinite
willingness to license works place increasing pressure on the judicial
assumption of sexuality-defined markets. Nonetheless, this assumption
seems necessary in order to sustain current fair use analysis. Courts accord
sexualizing uses disparate treatment in factor four market harm analysis.
This reinforces their special treatment in factor one transformativeness
analysis.
Part III-B addresses the uses of market language in a different part of the
fair use test, namely the first factor inquiry into whether the defendant’s use
5. See Randall B. Hicks, Note, Requiem for a Parody, 8 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
55, 57 (1985) (describing how this marks a change from past practice in fair use cases,
wherein explicit sexual content created an additional obstacle for parody defenses); see also
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 181 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the song “The
Cunnilingus Champion of Company C,” from an erotic revue called Let My People Come,
did not constitute a fair use of the words and music of “The Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of
Company B”); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding
no fair use when Disney characters were depicted in compromising positions, such as taking
drugs, having sex, and otherwise misbehaving).
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is commercial. Copyright’s reliance on an economic incentive theory
results in a systematic disregard for non-market incentives, leading to a
distorted view of creativity. While this benefits many defendants making
commercial fair uses, the law need not disparage non-market creation in
order to allow profit-making fair uses.
By favoring sexualization over other types of critique, fair use doctrine
systematically treats sex as especially oppositional and liberating, when in
fact it has no monopoly on critique and no necessarily disruptive effect on a
copyright owner’s message. Still, adding overt sexuality to a work could
challenge our ideas about the original, as well as proper sex and gender
roles.
Thus, this article does not argue against sexuality or
transformativeness, but rather against facile acceptance of an equation
between the two, particularly against the idea that other kinds of
transformation deserve less fair use protection and are more likely to fall
within a copyright owner’s legitimate market. Gender and sexuality play
varied roles in signaling criticism, defining markets, and establishing a
work’s place in cultural hierarchies. Fair use doctrine should pay attention
to these things, not sexuality itself.
I. WRITTEN ON THE BODY:6 TRANSFORMATIVENESS
A. Making Subtext Text
The public often subjects women’s bodies to debate, from contraception
and abortion to Katherine Harris’s makeup during the 2000 election
controversy. Where culture wars go, law usually follows. Amy Adler has
explored the effect of the female body on First Amendment law through the
nude dancing cases decided by the Supreme Court. In her account, the
female body is threatening, disruptive, ungoverned, and carnivalesque, and
this helps explain why the nude dancing cases themselves are full of uneasy
puns and strained logic.7 She describes several “culturally entrenched
views of the nude female form: that the female body is a site of unreason;
that it is barely intelligible; that it is inviting yet dangerous.”8
Fair use jurisprudence identifies transformable works as sites of
unreason, inviting yet dangerous. If a work has an intelligible meaning and
a creative re-use simply borrows the original to get attention, there is no

6. See JEANETTE WINTERSON, WRITTEN ON THE BODY (Vintage Books 2d ed. 1994)
(1992).
7. Amy Adler, Girls! Girls! Girls!: The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1108, 1110-11 (2005) (arguing that “fantasies and anxieties” concerning
female sexuality drove the Court to make illogical decisions in the nude dancing cases).
8. Id. at 1109, 1138 (claiming the female body poses a “threat to the possibility of
stable singular meaning”).
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favored parody, only satire. By contrast, if a work has multiple meanings,
only some of which the copyright owner endorses, a re-use that exposes
disfavored meanings is transformative and fair.
In Judge Leval’s influential words, a transformative use treats the
original as the “raw material” to produce something new and culturally
valuable.9 Such divisions between raw material and finished product,
natural and cultural, resources and results have strong gender implications.
Fair use law locates the responsibility for a transformative, parodic use—as
opposed to a merely satirical use—in the original work itself, which
contains subtext or other material that invites criticism. In cases of parody,
the original text asked for it.10 Parody’s transgressive, ungoverned
relationship to the original turns out to depend on the original author’s
inability to fix a meaning. Particularly relevant is Adler’s invocation of
Judith Butler’s position that “multiple meanings in language, as opposed to
a unified message, always carry the association of femininity.”11 Judges
see parody more readily when parodists use female bodies to show the
uncontrollable multiplicity of interpretation.12
In line with this link between embodied sexuality and transgressive
parody, recent cases have found sexually focused unauthorized derivative
works to be fair. In Campbell, the Court found a potentially valid fair use
because of the parodic view 2 Live Crew’s version offered of the original
Roy Orbison song. In a passage quoted by the Supreme Court, Judge
Nelson’s dissent from the court of appeals opinion argued that the parody
. . . reminds us that sexual congress with nameless streetwalkers is not
necessarily the stuff of romance and is not necessarily without its
consequences. The singers (there are several) have the same thing on
their minds as did the lonely man with the nasal voice, but here there is

9. Pierre Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990).
Campbell relied heavily on Judge Leval’s analysis; in addition, other cases have specifically
quoted Leval’s argument about “raw materials.” See, e.g., Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc.
v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998).
10. See Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural
Creativity, L. & CONTEMP. PROB. (2006) (manuscript at 9, on file with Journal) (arguing that
courts are more likely to find fair use when the original contains seeds of the critique
brought to fruition by an unauthorized use). This view posits the parodist as the ultimate
romantic author. As Dan Burk has written about notions of authorship as individual feats of
creation, “[t]he text itself becomes the feminized ‘other’ against which the author is
differentiated.” Dan L. Burk, Copyright and Feminism in Digital Media, 14 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 519, 546 (2006).
11. Adler, supra note 7, at 1138.
12. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1270 (11th Cir. 2001)
(noting that the new female character invented by Alice Randall to critique Margaret
Mitchell’s Gone With the Wind “is the vehicle of parody; she is its means—not its end”); see
also id. at 1279 (Marcus, J., concurring) (“Perhaps Randall based her story on the
perceptions of a single character to underscore the inherent subjectivity of storytelling, in
contrast to Mitchell’s disembodied, ‘objective’ narrator.”).
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no hint of wine and roses.13

Note in particular how the opinion imputes the motivations of the
narrators in the 2 Live Crew version to the narrator in the Orbison song.
Because of the later song, we can recognize that Orbison’s narrator has the
“same thing”—sex— on his mind as the later singers, but he pretties it up
and obscures his real desires with talk of wine and roses. The parody
consists of exposing the earlier song’s base and lustful nature, while also
exposing the woman in the song as base and unworthy.14
Moreover, the women in both songs become “streetwalkers.” This term
usually means “prostitutes,” even though neither set of lyrics says anything
about the women’s occupations. Because the men are attracted to the
women they watch (at least initially, in 2 Live Crew’s case), the women
walking openly and shamelessly in public must sell sex.15 The meaning of
the Greek root of “pornography” is “writing about whores.”16 Campbell,
then, is a case in which writing about women is turned, by the courts and
by the parodists, into pornography.
Campbell is the most relevant and recent Supreme Court case, but it is
far from alone in locating transformative value in commentary on women’s
bodies. Current fair use opinions treat sexualizing a text as automatically
constituting relevant commentary on the original, unlike other forms of
reworking.
Many of the most well-known cases of parodic and
transformative use involve sexualization and often mockery of women’s (or
dolls’) bodies.17 Women’s bodies are to be commented on, so the presence
13. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994) (quoting AcuffRose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1442 (6th Cir. 1992) (Nelson, J., dissenting)).
The reiteration that “there are several” singers, which was already apparent from the plural,
suggests that the men were all targeting the same woman, emphasizing her status as a
“public woman.”
14. See Acuff-Rose Music, 972 F.2d at 1446 (“The original work may not seem vulgar,
at first blush, but the 2 Live Crew group is telling us, knowingly or unknowingly, that
vulgar is precisely what ‘Oh, Pretty Woman’ is.”).
15. The film Pretty Woman, whose protagonist is a prostitute and whose title comes
from Orbison’s song, may have helped enable this conclusion. See PRETTY WOMAN
(Touchstone 1990).
16. Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589,
595.
17. The cases discussed in the text are the canonical ones that usually come up in
discussions of fair use/transformativeness, but there are others. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d
432, 434 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding fair use when a parody changed “When Sunny gets blue,
her eyes get gray and cloudy, then the rain begins to fall” to “When Sonny sniffs glue, her
eyes get red and bulgy, then her hair begins to fall”); Ellsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat’l Broad.
Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding fair use in a skit titled I Love Sodom, which
featured women dressed as caricatures of belly dancers as a replacement for the chorus line
that sang I Love New York). Similar reasoning occurs in defamation and related privacy tort
cases. See Geary v. Goldstein, No. 91 Civ. 6222 (KMW), 1996 WL 447776, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1996) (holding that the unauthorized editing of a television commercial,
which made it appear as if an actress was engaging in sexual relations instead of selling
bread was an obvious parody and not defamatory); Lisa R. Pruitt, Her Own Good Name:
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of a woman’s body in a work makes it fair game for fair use.18 In other
words, when a woman’s image becomes public, it is so public that ripping
her clothes off is a natural critical response.
B. Sexual Fair Uses
The dynamics linking sexualization to transformativeness have played
out in a variety of cases. In one prominent case, sexualization was
employed as conscious feminist critique. “Food Chain Barbie” was a series
of photographs, most of which portrayed “a nude Barbie in danger of being
attacked by vintage household appliances,” as in the following image:19

The defendant-artist Thomas Forsythe argued that his photos
meant
“to critique the objectification of women associated with [Barbie], and . . .
the conventional beauty myth and the societal acceptance of women as
objects, because this is what Barbie embodies.”20 The court accepted this
Two Centuries Of Talk About Chastity, 63 MD. L. REV. 401, 471-89 (2004) (discussing
cases in which sexually derogatory speech was deemed to be hyperbolic and parodic and
thus not defamatory). By contrast, right of publicity law has not developed around
exceptions for sexualized parody. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 962 (10th Cir. 1996) (explaining that the First Amendment protects
works using celebrity identities in many critical ways).
18. I thank Christine Haight Farley for this formulation.
19. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003); Tom
Forsythe, Malted Barbie (1997), available at http://www.tomforsythe.com/
Graphics/FoodChain/MaltedBarbie.jpg.
20. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 796.

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol15/iss2/8

6

Tushnet: Symposium: My Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender, and Fair Use in Copyright

2007]

MY FAIR LADIES

279

characterization, explaining that Forsythe exacts revenge for the harm
Barbie has done to women by harming Barbie:
Forsythe turns [Mattel’s carefully cultivated image of beauty, wealth,
and glamour] on its head, so to speak, by displaying carefully positioned,
nude, and sometimes frazzled looking Barbies in often ridiculous and
apparently dangerous situations . . . . In some of Forsythe’s photos,
Barbie is about to be destroyed or harmed by domestic life in the form of
kitchen appliances, yet continues displaying her well known smile,
disturbingly oblivious to her predicament. As portrayed in some of
Forsythe’s photographs, the appliances are substantial and
overwhelming, while Barbie looks defenseless. In other photographs,
Forsythe conveys a sexualized perspective of Barbie by showing the
nude doll in sexually suggestive contexts.21

The pictures can be interpreted as saying that being perfect and smiling
all the time will not keep you safe. This is not necessarily a feminist
message, but it can be if it is understood as a call to stop smiling and start
fighting.
A similar result occurred when another artist used Barbie to create
Dungeon Dolls, which were re-painted and re-costumed dolls with
SuperStar Barbie heads.22 Susanne Pitt sold the dolls through her web site.
Pitt dressed the dolls in sexually provocative costumes and altered Barbie’s
anatomy in ways the court’s opinion does not describe (out of a concern for
the doll’s modesty?), but that at a minimum included the addition of
nipples, as in the following image:23

21. See id. at 802.
22. See Mattel, Inc. v. Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 315, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
23. Susanne Pitt, “Lily Van Fraeunau” (2001) (image on file with author).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2007

7

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 8

280

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 15:2

On Pitt’s web site, “Lily the Diva Dominatrix,” a re-costumed and
apparently physically altered Barbie doll, was the protagonist in a tale of
sexual slavery and torture, the victim of which was another re-configured
Barbie.24 Pitt contended that this scenario was offered “as entertainment in
The court found
the same free spirit as the original creator.”25
transformation because “[t]o the Court’s knowledge, there is no Mattel line
of ‘S & M’ Barbie.”26 Putting nipples and bondage gear on Barbie acted as
commentary on Barbie’s always already sexual nature.27
These critiques proceeded by way of stripping and threatening Barbie,
not by providing an alternative beauty ideal.28 Of course, an alternative
beauty ideal probably would not have been substantially similar to Barbie
and thus would not have posed a copyright issue in the first place. If the
master’s tools are required to tear down the master’s house, fair use allows
24. Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 322.
25. Id. at 319 (describing Defendant’s assertion that Barbie’s original form may have
been derived from a German “adult” cartoon and doll).
26. Id. at 322.
27. See id. at 322-23.
28. Another Barbie conflict recently erupted in Brazil over paintings depicting the doll
as a lesbian. See Stewart Who?, Come on Barbie, Let’s Go Party, GAY.COM, Aug. 25, 2006,
http://uk.gay.com/headlines/10294. A Mattel spokesperson said, “‘Barbie is a very proper
lady and she is not happy about being portrayed as something that she isn’t . . . . Also,
Barbie is 46 years old, and she should be respected.’” Id. The article pointed out that “even
‘very proper’ 46-year-old ladies have sex, and it could be lesbian sex, anonymous sex or
S&M sex.” Id. The artist also responded: “‘Barbie is exploited by Mattel. She wears a
bikini, she shows off her belly, has big breasts, and even has a boyfriend.’” Id.
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the rebels to pick up those tools. For this reason, I do not claim that the
courts wrongly decided the cases discussed in this section. The revelations
that even nice girls have sex and that smiles and good behavior will not
protect women from violence are worthwhile.29
But transformative is not the same as liberating, nor would we want
courts making such equations. Feminists and anti-feminists alike can use
re-appropriation as a tactic. Like Roy Orbison, photographer Annie
Leibovitz found her tribute to female beauty challenged.30 Leibovitz posed
her subject, a naked and very pregnant Demi Moore, in a manner
reminiscent of Botticelli’s Venus for the cover of Vanity Fair.31 The pose,
known as “Venus Pudens,” is meant to symbolize either modesty or
shame.32 Moore’s expression was serious. And sure enough, a man came
along to tell her to lighten up. Paramount’s ad agency proposed posters for
the soon-to-be-released movie Naked Gun 33 1/3 that superimposed
comedian Leslie Nielsen’s face over those of famous women.33 Paramount
approved the concept and had a photographer recreate the Leibovitz shot
with an enormous fake diamond ring on the model’s hand where Moore
had worn a large but real diamond ring.34

29. Cf. Amy Adler, What’s Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for
Artistic Expression, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1499, 1524-31 (1996) (arguing that art can use
pornographic images to critique the pornographic imagination). As Adler cogently argues,
it can be difficult to put a clear feminist/anti-feminist label on political art, which often has
as part of its aim the destabilization of meaning itself. See id. at 1542-44. Nonetheless,
disempowered speakers may need the attention-getting benefits of appropriation, including
appropriation of copyrighted works, more than empowered speakers who have other paths
to audiences. See id. at 1569-71.
30. See Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 1998).
31. See VANITY FAIR, Aug. 1991, front cover.
32. Leibovitz, 137 F.3d at 111 n.1.
33. Id. at 111.
34. Id. at 111-12. The case concerns Paramount’s appropriation of Leibovitz’s
expression as shown in Moore’s body, but there is actually another relevant body—that of
the poster model. Her body, exposed to the world in the ad, is completely submerged in the
court’s analysis. Consider how the passive voice of the opinion and the manipulations
performed on the photograph reduce the model to a mannequin rather than a person:
The model was carefully posed so that her posture and hands precisely matched those of
Moore in the Leibovitz photograph. A large ring was placed on the same finger as the one
appearing on Moore’s hand. The photograph was digitally enhanced by a computer to make
the skin tone and shape of the body more closely match those of Moore in the Leibovitz
photograph. The final step was to superimpose on the model’s body a photograph of
Nielsen’s face, with his jaw and eyes positioned roughly at the same angle as Moore’s, but
with her serious look replaced by Nielsen’s mischievous smirk.
Id. at 111-12 (footnote omitted). The court says that “a photograph of Nielsen’s face” was
superimposed on “the model’s body,” rather than on “a photograph of the model’s body,”
already slipping between the woman’s body and its representation. Id. at 112. Computer
manipulation reshaped the model to be more like Demi Moore, letting one woman stand in
for the other. Even in this case where women’s labor of all kinds seems so visible, there is a
woman whose contribution is vital and yet at the same time irrelevant to the law.
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The Second Circuit found that the poster served as a commentary on the
seriousness, even pretentiousness, of the original.35 The parody criticized
the photograph’s “undue self-importance.”36 It asked, “Who does she think
she is?” The court does not specify which person is unduly self-important,
the photographer or her subject, but maybe it does not matter.37
Separately—or not so separately, despite the court’s articulation of two
distinct rationales—“the ad might also be reasonably perceived as
interpreting the Leibovitz photograph to extol the beauty of the pregnant
female body, and, rather unchivalrously, to express disagreement with this
message.”38 By exposing her body, Moore invited ridicule, as Leibovitz
did by exposing her art.

35. Id. at 114 (finding that the distinctly different facial expressions of Nielsen in the
poster and Moore on the magazine cover highlight the parodic nature of the ad).
36. Id.
37. See id. at 114-15. Acting, a profession of artifice and thus femininity, generates
disdain in right of publicity cases too, as if acting were something anyone could do (were it
not for accident of beauty), compared to professional sports, which almost always requires
actual talent. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959,
973 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[M]any people pay a lot of money to watch Demi Moore ‘act’ and
Michael Jordan play basketball.”); id. at 975 (“Professional athletes may be more
responsible for their celebrity status, however, because athletic success is fairly
straightforwardly the result of an athlete’s natural talent and dedication. Thus, baseball
players may deserve to profit from the commercial value of their identities more than movie
stars.”).
38. See Leibovitz, 137 F.3d at 115 (footnote omitted).
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Jeff Koons, a conceptual artist and consummate self-promoter, has been
sued a number of times for copyright infringement because his work
depends on taking and reusing popular images.39 As discussed in the next
section, he has suffered some significant losses.40 Recently, however, he
prevailed in Blanch v. Koons.41 In that case, Koons copied a model’s legs
from a fashion photograph to use in the painting Niagara:42

39. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304-06 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing one of
Koons’s sculptures, which was based on one of Rogers’s photographs capturing a couple
and their puppies posed on a bench).
40. See, e.g., United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 373-74, 385
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that Koons’s sculpture of the dog in his “Wild Boy with Puppy”
sculpture infringed the “Garfield” cartoon character Odie); Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ.
6055(RO), 1993 WL 97381, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993) (finding against Koons after he
copied a photograph purchased from a gift shop); see also Amy M. Adler, Note, PostModern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359, 1367 (1990) (discussing a
Koons Pink Panther sculpture that prompted another lawsuit, this one settled out of court).
Christine Haight Farley suggested at the IP/Gender conference that, because the Pink
Panther was not associated with a woman (or even with muted sexuality) initially, a court
would be unlikely to find a Koons sculpture incorporating the Pink Panther to be fair use.
Koons himself saw the Pink Panther as a sexual object that a woman might use as a
masturbation aid; perhaps he was inspired by the sexual connotations of “pink.” See JEFF
KOONS, THE JEFF KOONS HANDBOOK 104 (1992).
41. 396 F. Supp. 2d 476, 480-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd 2006 WL 3040666 (2d Cir. Oct.
26, 2006). I thank Peter Jaszi for drawing my attention to this case.
42. See Jeff Koons, Niagara (2000), available at http://www.guggenheim
collection.org/site/artist_work_lg_P65.html.
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Calling the legs “anonymous,” Koons insisted that the legs were “a fact
in the world.”43 “[T]hey are not anyone’s legs in particular,”44 and thus he
had the right to copy them to critique modern consumption-oriented
culture. Koons was speaking about fair use, but he found it necessary to
alienate the models’ body parts from the models.45 Koons was wrong.
Those legs were the models’ legs. That does not make his use of a fashion
photo unfair, but it is telling that he explained himself as a re-user of
materials (women’s images) that were just out there in the world, free for
him to use, with no humans involved.
Finally, the court’s discussion—or lack thereof—of parody in the
Starballz case, in which George Lucas sued the makers of a sexually
explicit animated film, is particularly instructive.46 According to the
filmmakers, they based the story in part on Star Wars and in part on other
well-known films.47 In its opinion denying preliminary injunctive relief,
the court analyzed the case as follows: “Starballz is a parody of Star Wars,
in that it is a ‘literary or artistic work that broadly mimics an author’s
characteristic style and holds it up to ridicule.’”48 The most sexually
focused work in the reported cases turns into the most obvious parody.
Star Wars had no overtly sexual content and only a hint of romance. In
that way, it was much like Roy Orbison’s song or Barbie’s carefully
cultivated image.
Adding sex therefore automatically worked as
commentary because sex always plays a part in the subtext of human
relations, especially when it involves a woman.
One way to see these cases is as being about competing interpretations of
women as sexual objects—pretty woman or ugly woman, cheerful doll
genuinely happy with the roles assigned her or naked and exploited doll
possibly screaming inside.49 But the criticism of the role seems to require
criticism of the woman who fills it. Jeff Koons turns a woman’s body into
anonymous fact, Paramount suggests that pregnant bodies are ridiculous,
and so on. We lack a fair use case about a work that, through
transformation, argues that the original was not serious enough about

43. Blanch, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 481.
44. See id. (quoting Koons’s statement that “[m]y paintings are not about objects or
images that I might invent, but rather about how we relate to the things that we actually
experience”) (emphasis added).
45. See id.
46. See Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 901 (N.D. Cal.
2002).
47. Sophia, George Lucas v. Star Ballz, CINEMA ONLINE, Mar. 2002, http://
www.cinemaonline.com.my/news/news.asp?search=starballz (explaining that Starballz also
spoofed The Full Monty and The Silence of The Lambs).
48. Lucasfilm Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d at 901.
49. Christine Haight Farley formulated the issue this way at the IP/Gender Conference.
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women’s bodies. Such works exist in literature, including Wide Sargasso
Sea (revisioning Jane Eyre), Ahab’s Wife (Moby Dick), Mary Reilly (Dr.
Jekyll & Mr. Hyde), Lo’s Diary (Lolita), and others,50 but the case law has
not yet dealt with them.
C. Contrasts: Commercialism, Violence, Desexualization
Sexuality and women’s bodies have assumed an importance in the case
law that is not ideal in that the case law constrains the options for parody
and other reworkings. Adding sex is not the only route to fair use. Courts
have deemed large-scale cataloging projects and reverse engineering of
computer programs fair use.51 With creative re-uses of individual works,
however, non-sexual transformativeness arguments are notably less likely
to succeed.52
Rogers v. Koons provides a useful example. Rogers involved the
unauthorized conversion of a photo, String of Puppies, into a sculpture.53
According to Koons, he chose the photo, which he found on a greeting
card, because he thought it “typical, commonplace and familiar.”54 The
content of the original did not really matter because the point of Koons’s
work was to defamiliarize and reinterpret the banal objects that surround us
every day and generally pass unnoticed.55 But for precisely this reason, the
Second Circuit ruled that Koons had no justification for picking this
particular image and thus no fair use defense.56
50. See Abigail Derecho, Archontic Literature: A Definition, a History, and Several
Theories of Fan Fiction, in FAN FICTION AND FAN COMMUNITIES IN THE AGE OF THE
INTERNET: NEW ESSAYS 61, 66-72 (Karen Hellekson & Kristina Busse eds., 2006) (arguing
that, since before the birth of the novel, women’s characteristic mode of production has been
to rewrite canonical texts to make them tell “better” stories, sometimes following a
traditional romance narrative and sometimes engaging in more disruptive interventions).
51. See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 609 (9th
Cir. 2000) (finding that reverse engineering used to copy software from gaming console was
fair use).
52. But see MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm. Inc., No. 00 Civ. 6068
(GBD), 2004 WL 434404, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004) (finding that mockery of
commercialism in political ad was fair use, even if the main target was not the copyright
owner—a credit card company that encouraged free spending); Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony
Music Entm’t, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that a commentary on
the use of drugs and corruption was a legitimate parody of Louis Armstrong’s What a
Wonderful World).
53. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304-05 (2d Cir. 1992).
54. Id. at 305.
55. See id. at 304 (linking Koons’s sculpture to a tradition of work that extracted
meaning from everyday items, including Andy Warhol’s reproduction of Campbell soup
cans).
56. Id. at 310 (emphasizing that “public awareness of the original work” is critical to
legitimate parody, the function of that rule is “to insure that credit is given where credit is
due,” and the audience must be aware that “underlying the parody there is an original and
separate expression, attributable to a different artist” either because the work is well known
or because its existence is acknowledged by the parodist).
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Likewise, in United Feature Syndicate v. Koons, Koons admitted he did
not know the name of the cartoon dog he copied, stating “I never had the
slightest intention (or even knowledge) that I was including a special dog
named ‘Odie.’”57 The court therefore concluded that he could not be
parodying that particular dog.58 Koons used almost exactly the same
reasoning defending his copying of a fashion photograph for Niagara—the
“anonymous” models are no one in particular, the photo is “typical,” and
identical images “can be found in almost any glossy magazine”—but the
court accepted that critiquing the general culture of mass consumption was
a legitimate justification for copying particular expressions of that culture.59
It is hard to see how the cases differ, except that Koons won when he used
women’s images.60 Perhaps fashion photographs of women are so
powerfully associated with the culture of consumption that each one can be
blamed for overall societal values, while Odie and a single greeting card
are harmless.
Rogers and United Feature Syndicate are not alone in rejecting fair use
defenses based on critiques of banality. Michael Moore’s film The Big One
used advertisements mimicking ads for the popular film Men in Black,
showing the pudgy Moore with his microphone aping the heroic pose of
Will Smith and Tommy Lee Jones with their guns.61 The court found no
fair use even though the contrast between the two films highlights the
frivolity of popular entertainment given that real corruption, rather than a
fake alien invasion, poses a serious threat to Americans.62 Moore’s
schlubby body is not a parody of Smith’s heroic one, whereas 2 Live
Crew’s degraded women do parody Orbison’s pretty woman and Nielsen’s
faux-pregnant body parodies Moore’s heroically pregnant body.
57. 817 F. Supp. 370, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (referring to the subject of the sculpture, a
character from the “Garfield” comic strip).
58. Id. (concluding that there was no fair parody because Koons could have used other
images to make the same point and explaining that “since ‘Odie’ is not an object of the
parody but merely is claimed to be ‘an animal figure’ that is part of a more general parody
on the banality of life or criticism of the mass media culture at large, the teachings of Rogers
require that Koons’ [sic] parody be rejected as a matter of law”).
59. Blanch v. Koons, 396 F. Supp. 2d 476, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
60. See id. at 483 (distinguishing Rogers as different on its facts, without further
explanation). The recent court of appeals opinion declares Niagara a satire, not a parody,
then cites Rogers, but fails to explain why Koons wins now and lost then. See Blanch v.
Koons, 2006 WL 3040666, at *9.
61. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Miramax Films Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1179,
1182-83 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
62. See id. at 1188-89 (holding that Michael Moore’s imitation of the poster and ads for
Men in Black to advertise his anti-corporate film The Big One was not a fair use even
though it contrasted the former’s fantastic enemies with actual, banal wrongdoing); see also
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1300-01 (C.D.
Cal. 1995) (finding that the James Bond-type character in a Honda commercial was not a
legitimate parody).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol15/iss2/8

14

Tushnet: Symposium: My Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender, and Fair Use in Copyright

2007]

MY FAIR LADIES

287

Like critiquing banality, adding violence to an existing work rarely
allows a parodist to succeed in a fair use defense. In The Cat NOT in the
Hat! case, for example, the Ninth Circuit found the analogies between Dr.
Seuss’s famous feline and O.J. Simpson unfair.63 The defendants argued
that, like the Cat in the Hat, O.J. Simpson acted contrary to moral and legal
authority by killing two people.64 O.J. Simpson then relied on tricks to
create a spectacle that created a big mess, just like the Cat.65 While the
original Cat comes off as benign, Simpson’s violence shows that defying
authority is not harmless fun, especially for the people authority should
protect.66 The court found this defense “pure schtick” and “completely
unconvincing.”67
In another example of adding violence to an original work, the Famous
Chicken, a costumed entertainer, successfully defended an act in which it
danced with and then assaulted a compatriot dressed as Barney the Purple
63. Dr. Seuss Entm’t, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 (9th Cir.
1997).
64. Id. at 1402.
65. Id.
66. In essence, the defendants argued that The Cat NOT in the Hat! retold the story
from a perspective similar to that of the mother who comes home at the end of the Seuss
book and finds a mess that presumably will be up to her to clean. From her point of view,
the story is not very funny. The Cat NOT in the Hat! might well have generated similar
unease by emphasizing how popular coverage of the Simpson case turned violent death into
gruesome entertainment. Or the defendants might be gleefully exploiting that crass public
voyeurism. See Adler, supra note 29, at 1543 (noting that unconventional art often
challenges mainstream attitudes by presenting images that allow multiple interpretations).
Meaning is not under the parodist’s control any more than it is controlled by the original
author.
67. Dr. Seuss Entm’t, L.P., 109 F.3d at 1403.
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Dinosaur.68 His legal victory shows that adding violence can act as the
foundation of a successful fair use, but it is not as predictable under current
law. It is perhaps relevant that the violence against Barney had
homophobic elements because The Famous Chicken described Barney as a
“sissy.”69 Sissies should be publicly exposed by real men (or real
chickens)—like female bodies, gay male bodies are fair game.
Relatedly, courts have split on whether showing clips of the violent
beating of Reginald Denny was fair use given its newsworthiness,70 but
reprinting a nude photo of Miss Universe Puerto Rico to illustrate her
questionable morals was of enough public interest to justify the copying.71
Would a photograph of a Miss Universe casting a vote or snubbing a
homeless person also reflect on her morals enough to allow unauthorized
copying? One might distinguish those situations with the observation that
the nude photo is the story, whereas photos of other behaviors are only
evidence of the underlying facts. But, even aside from the ways in which
photos may prove otherwise unsupported allegations, this distinction
replicates what Catharine MacKinnon identifies as pornography’s ability to
define, even create, women in its own image.72 The nude picture becomes
the truth about the model; through her picture, she becomes public
property.73
The distinction between a photo in which a woman is nude (what she is
becomes newsworthy) and one in which she is clothed (what she is doing
may be newsworthy) is just another way that society singles out women’s
sexuality for special treatment. Indeed, the fact that a woman poses for a
nude photo may say nothing at all about her sexuality from her perspective.
It may say much more about her financial situation and her alternative
means of making money. She may perceive the modeling as authentic
sexual expression, she may not think much about it at all, or she may
68. See Lyons P’Ship, L.P. v. Giannoulas, 14 F. Supp. 2d 947, 955 (N.D. Tex. 1998),
aff’d, 179 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 1999).
69. See id. at 950-51 (using “sissy,” a highly charged word, to enforce norms of
masculinity and heterosexuality that Barney evidently failed to follow and describing
Defendant’s Barney character as “prancing gingerly . . . as the real Barney would walk” and
dancing in a “characteristic fairylike” manner). Homophobia and misogyny are connected,
as evidenced here. A sissy is a boy who cannot or would not escape his mother. I thank
Ann Bartow for pressing me on this point.
70. Compare L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, 149 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir.
2002) (finding no fair use), and L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV, 108 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th
Cir. 1997) (finding no fair use), with L. A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924
(9th Cir. 2002) (finding fair use when the clip was used in an opening montage).
71. See Nuñez v. Carribean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding
fair use because, among other reasons, “the pictures were shown not just to titillate, but also
to inform”).
72. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 147-48 (1987).
73. See id. at 148.
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believe that it helps define her sexuality because the existence of the photos
will affect how people react to her. Even the idea that the photo reveals
some truth about the woman is bound up in gender and sexual norms.
What if the original is already sexual? The recent Clean Flicks case,
involving “family-friendly” companies that created unauthorized edited
versions of popular Hollywood films for sale, did discuss whether
removing sexually explicit content was transformative.74 Unfortunately, its
reasoning was extremely limited.
The Clean Flicks court, refusing to find transformation, analogized the
bowdlerization of Titanic and similar films to taking a sledgehammer to
Michelangelo’s David and ruled that there was no right to “put a fig leaf”
over sexual images.75 The comparison is inapt: The David is in the public
domain, and indeed a readily available magnet set allows anyone to put a
fig leaf, or more elaborate clothing, over a picture of him. More important,
the David is a unique physical object. Taking a sledgehammer to a copy
would be a powerful way to make a claim about the problem of male
nudity but would not deprive the world of the original, just as altering a
copy of a movie arguably reveals a truth without destroying the original
work.
The Clean Flicks defendants argued that their use was transformative:
Editing produced a movie without extreme sex, profanity, or violence that
was still entertaining.76 Some audiences considered the altered version still
worth watching, proving that objectionable content is not necessary for a
movie to be a success. Rejecting the defendants’ argument, the Clean
Flicks court adopted an unfortunately cramped view of transformation.77 It
held that the benefit of creating child-friendly movies “is inconsequential to
copyright law”78 because a creator has “right[s] to protect its creation in the
form in which it was created.”79 However, such reasoning does nothing to
distinguish Clean Flicks from Campbell. Clean Flicks may have been
rightly decided for other reasons,80 but it unfortunately reinforces the idea
that adding sex is somehow different in kind than other alterations of a

74. Clean Flicks, LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D. Colo. 2006) (concluding
that “there is nothing transformative about the edited copies”).
75. Id. at 1240.
76. Id. at 1241.
77. Id. at 1242.
78. Id. at 1240.
79. Id. at 1242.
80. I think Clean Flicks was rightly decided because the transformative message—that
sex and violence are unnecessary to good entertainment—is designed to be hidden from
most viewers of the altered movies. 2 Live Crew did not set out to ensure that Roy
Orbison’s song never reached listeners’ ears, whereas the Clean Flicks defendants explicitly
sought to substitute and prevent comparison of the original to the altered version.
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work.
Hoepker v. Kruger,81 though not a copyright fair use case, suggests some
potential for a broadly feminist version of transformative fair use that does
not require sexualization. Barbara Kruger, a collage artist known for her
feminist position on issues of beauty, femininity, and power, copied a male
photographer’s picture, “Charlotte As Seen By Thomas.”82 She cropped
and enlarged the photo and superimposed three red blocks containing the
words “It’s a small world but not if you have to clean it.”83

The original work’s title makes the woman, Charlotte Dabney, the object
of the male gaze, contesting Dabney’s agency even though she might
initially appear to be actively looking. Kruger’s slogan refocuses attention
on what Dabney is doing and thinking—in Kruger’s version, she seems to
be cleaning, perhaps obsessively, though there is plenty of room for
interpretation.84 The court in Hoepker did not decide the copyright
81. 200 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
82. Id. at 342.
83. Id.
84. See Nancy Spector, The Collection, Guggenheim Museum http://
www.guggenheimcollection.org/site/movement_work_md_Neo_Conceptualism_81_1.htm
(last visited Nov. 5, 2006) (“Kruger brings the issue of gender identification into question
through her ambiguous use of the neutral pronouns ‘I,’, ‘you,’ and ‘we’ in her phrases, such
as the following: YOUR GAZE HITS THE SIDE OF MY FACE; YOU MAKE HISTORY
WHEN YOU DO BUSINESS; YOU INVEST IN THE DIVINITY OF THE
MASTERPIECE; WHEN I HEAR THE WORD CULTURE, I TAKE OUT MY
CHECKBOOK.
To some extent, Kruger reconfigures the conventional gendered
subject/object relationship by bestowing the female voice with authority, but quickly
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question because it determined that the photograph’s expired foreign
copyright had not been properly restored, but it did state without analysis
that Kruger’s work was transformative for purposes of Dabney’s right of
publicity claim.85 If that conclusion also applied to the copyright claims,
Hoepker would be a heartening instance of fair use based on a playful,
feminist use that did not depend on ridiculing a woman’s sexuality (with a
dollop of irony that the woman was denied payment for that reclamation).
Perhaps if more feminist art enters the commercial sphere—a topic to
which I return in Part IV infra—courts will have more opportunities to
evaluate such reworkings.
II. PUBLIC WOMAN, PRIVATE MAN
The parody cases can be compared with the Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises86 and Salinger v. Random House, Inc.,87
involving works by men who did not want the works published (or did not
want them published in The Nation, in the former case). In the Nations
case, in order to protect his privacy interests, the Supreme Court held that
President Ford had a First Amendment right not to speak that factored into
copyright doctrine by heavily weighing the unpublished nature of a work
against a fair use defense.88 In Salinger, the Second Circuit then applied an
almost absolute rule against fair use of unpublished works when it found
that a biography of J.D. Salinger infringed Salinger’s unpublished letters.89
Ford and Salinger had a right to stay silent, to keep their words from being
used against them. Demi Moore and Annie Liebovitz did not.
The feminist critique of privacy rights argues that both sides of the
public/private divide reinforce male power. Making fair game of women in
public is part of patriarchy. The choice is to be open to the world or open
to one man, so the one man often looks better by comparison.90 Recall that
copying Miss Puerto Rico’s modeling photos was fair use because their
very existence justified widespread publication. She was willing to let
some people see images of her nude, so everyone had an interest in doing
so.91 Jeff Koons got to use pictures of women’s legs because their public

subverts this mere reversal of power by scrambling the identities of speaker and audience.”).
85. Hoepker, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
86. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
87. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
88. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559.
89. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 95-96 (holding that fair use was not “traditionally” recognized
as a defense to infringement of unpublished works, especially unpublished personal letters).
90. See, e.g., Pruitt, supra note 17, at 407-08.
91. See Nuñez v. Carribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F. 3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2000).
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circulation made them “not anyone’s legs in particular.”92
Privacy, on the other hand, has too often been used to keep women under
control in the private sphere. Privacy rights keep outsiders from interfering
with a man’s control over his women and make women’s attempts to speak
out about their circumstances shameful and inappropriate contamination of
the public with what should be kept secret.93 Denying fair use when a
man’s secret words are publicized is thus consistent with a tradition of
letting men do what they want in private, without condemnation or control
from outside.94
Proponents of moral rights,95 along with people who do not believe that
the First Amendment requires any particular kind of fair use, have used the
idea that free speech includes a right to stay silent to argue that
transformative use can harm the original author’s speech interests.96 In this
argument, publication does not terminate the personality interest that the
author retains in having his (or her) message remain untainted. Authors
have a right not to be made to stand for something repugnant to them by
having their works appropriated for someone else’s agenda.
A moral right against distortion assumes that iron control over
interpretation is possible. By contrast, much transformative use rhetoric,
including my own, claims that it is quixotic for copyright owners to claim
integrity rights once their works have entered the public commercial
sphere.97 Some fair use cases employ a variant on this argument, holding
that the fact that a work is published favors the defendant in a fair use

92. See Blanch v. Koons, 396 F. Supp, 2d 476, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
93. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, in
FEMINISMS, 345, 356-57 (Sandra Kamp & Judith Squires eds., 1997); Reva B. Siegel, “The
Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2153 (1996)
(arguing that after the nineteenth-century abolishment of the privilege of wife-beating,
courts have shielded perpetrators of domestic violence based on the right to marital privacy).
94. See Salinger, 811 F.2d at 93 n.2 (noting that one of the objectionable takings by
Salinger’s biographer was his close paraphrase of Salinger’s written dismay at learning that
a former girlfriend was marrying an older man (Charlie Chaplin)). The letter disparages
Chaplin’s body freely, as someone speaking privately is more likely to do. Id.
95. For an overview of moral rights theories, see Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing
Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353 (2006).
96. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287,
358-61 (1988) (arguing that the First Amendment principle of allowing speakers to reach
their audiences without distortion supports moral rights); David McGowan, Some Realism
About the Free-Speech Critique of Copyright, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 435, 454 (2005)
(arguing against the “transformation is a First Amendment right” position).
97. See, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights,
Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 365,
(1992) (arguing that re-appropriation of popular images is both inevitable and valuable for
human flourishing); Rebecca Tushnet, Comment, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction,
and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651, 675 (1997) (“The price of widespread
popularity is a loss of control over reception.”).
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analysis.98 Public availability always leads to interpretation and the
creation of multiple meanings.
I am not against interpretation. But what courts recognize as legitimate
interpretation, it turns out, has predictable sexual and gendered
components—to be a “public woman” is a far different thing than to be a
“public man,” just as a “streetwalker” is different from a “man in the
street.” Thus, in Leibovitz, a woman’s proud celebration of her pregnant
body necessarily invited negative commentary from passersby.99 We
already know that Barbie is sexual, says Judge Kozinski, so her proprietors
have no right to complain when someone makes that more explicit.100 An
unchaste doll cannot be raped.
Of course, a plastic doll cannot be raped, chaste or not. Bodies are
funny, sex is funny, and anyone who deals in bodies can expect some rude
surprises. But in a culture full of disputes over sexuality and gender norms,
it should be no surprise that our copyright cases are not exempt from those
battles101 and that women in particular may find themselves mocked
mercilessly or exposed beyond what they were willing to reveal.
One response to my criticism of the use of the public/private division in
fair use could be to reconceptualize the second factor, the nature of the
work, in light of the importance of the use to the audience. Wide
distribution could still matter because audiences may be powerfully
affected by works to which they are exposed. An individual may need to
respond to a work that has become part of her consciousness.102 This
audience interest is not based on the author’s privacy interests, whether
preserved or foregone, but on the effects of the text. Once the text is
widely disseminated, it is no longer tied to the author alone.
Going beyond a test that only looks at what a particular work has put on
display, analysis of the second factor could explicitly hold that the nature of
98. See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Published
works are more likely to qualify as fair use because the first appearance of the artist's
expression has already occurred.”); Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1078 (2d Cir.
1992) (explaining that the plaintiff’s work was “published work available to the general
public,” and thus the second factor of the fair use analysis favored defendant); Barton
Beebe, An Empirical Study of the U.S. Copyright Fair Use Cases, 1978-2005, at 10
(working precis), available at http://www.bartonbeebe.com (examining all the district court
cases considering fair use defenses and finding twenty-two opinions where unpublished
status disfavored fair use, and twenty-six where published status favored fair use).
99. See Liebovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998).
100. See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
101. See Adler, supra note 7, at 1155 (“[L]egal rules, especially when related to speech,
are steeped in cultural anxieties, fantasies, and prejudices.”).
102. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993)
(arguing that there is a natural right to respond creatively to one’s environment, which
presently includes many copyrighted works).
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the work includes whether it is relevant to a matter of public interest.103
The personal can be political, and the private can be publicized. Courts
could thus evaluate fair use of unpublished works depending on the
importance to the audience of using the unpublished material to evaluate
what they already know, such as relevant facts about an important public
figure.104 This would allow fair use doctrine to harmonize its treatment of
what is “exposed” within the confines of a published work, which includes
the subtext that a transformative use may bring to the surface, with its
treatment of unpublished works that illuminate publicly available works,
such as letters from an author.
III. SEX SELLS: MARKETS IN FAIR USE
A. Meat Market: Sexuality and Market Segmentation
The most famous fair use case of the past few years is Suntrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., involving Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With the Wind
(GWTW) and Alice Randall’s The Wind Done Gone (TWDG).105 Randall’s
book is a retelling of the GWTW story from the point of view of a new
character, Scarlett O’Hara’s mulatto half-sister. In finding that the book
was likely a fair use, the Eleventh Circuit held that the book was “a specific
criticism of and rejoinder to the depiction of slavery and the relationships
between blacks and whites in GWTW.”106 In particular, Randall’s
depictions of homosexuality and interracial sexual relationships served as
an “attack” on GWTW.107 Though the court did not link homosexuality to
Randall’s racial critique, it nonetheless found that overt homosexuality had
a special role to play in analyzing the potential harm to the Mitchell estate’s
market.108 The estate refused to allow licensed derivative works to refer to
homosexuality, and therefore Randall was not usurping a market the estate
103. Cf. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (suggesting that publication of private emails regarding election machines was fair
use because it was in the “public interest”).
104. One court raised this possibility as part of transformativeness analysis in discussing
whether a magazine could disseminate unpublished early works of the white rap artist
Eminem as part of an editorial position that Eminem’s massive success came from
exploiting, rather than respecting, African-American culture. See Shady Records, Inc. v.
Source Enters., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 9944(GEL), 2005 WL 14920, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3,
2005) (“[As part of a news report,] the copying of the registered excerpts would be
‘transformative,’ and therefore potentially protected by fair use, in that the copying altered
the message of the Works to one about the (co-) author himself.”).
105. 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
106. Id. at 1269. Of course, racial and sexual stereotypes are intertwined. What is your
mental image of the woman in Orbison’s song? Is she the same race as the woman you
imagine as 2 Live Crew’s target?
107. Id. at 1270-71.
108. Id. at 1271 n.26.
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was likely to exploit.109
This analysis is terribly incomplete. It is not usual to separate potential
markets by plot and characterization. If the Mitchell estate had vowed
never to authorize a version of GWTW set in outer space, that would not
mean that retelling was free for unauthorized use. A copyright owner can
decide to stay out of a market without forfeiting its rights in that market.110
The court may perceive the estate’s reasons for foreclosing the possibility
of a gay Ashley, no matter how well-written, as censorious and illegitimate.
The estate has not, after all, disavowed any possibility of a space opera
version.111
Perhaps the estate’s reasons for preventing versions with gay Ashleys are
so likely to be shared by copyright owners that, in general, making a
copyrighted character gay will not interfere with a traditional, reasonable,
or likely to be developed market.112 TBS’s recent advertising campaign for
The Lord of the Rings trilogy depicting Sam and Frodo as “Secret
Lovers”113 challenges this assumption, and the success of Brokeback
Mountain114 and the rise of gay-friendly productions will continue to put
pressure on it. Moreover, this apparently objective reason collapses back
109. Id. at 1270-71 (finding that the portrayal of homosexuality in TWDG has “special
relevance” for the fourth fair use factor); see also id. at 1282 n.6 (Marcus, J., concurring)
(noting the Mitchell estate was “loath to license a derivative work that contained” elements
such as homosexuality); cf. Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Giannoulas, 14 F. Supp. 2d 947, 955
(N.D. Tex. 1998), aff’d, 179 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding fair use of the loveable, and
detestable, children’s entertainer Barney when a competing entertainer, the Famous
Chicken, made a mockery of Barney’s “lovable, sissy” image).
110. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 14546 (2d Cir.1998) (declaring that copyright law allows copyright owners the ability to refuse
to enter a particular market); cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine
Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 570 (2004) (discussing
playwrights’ ability to refuse to authorize unusual gender or racial casting of their plays).
111. See The Patry Copyright Blog, http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005/04 /parodypolitical-correctness-and-first.html (Apr. 29, 2005) (suggesting that the decision in Suntrust
was motivated by political correctness). Patry suggests that an unauthorized derivative
work of GWTW that expressed anti-gay sentiments would have been found unfair and that
the court was uniquely solicitous of anti-racist critiques. See id. How such rewriting would
have worked is unclear. Most works express normative attitudes towards sex and gender
(that is part of what it means to be normative), so there may be an inherent bias in current
transformative use doctrine based on what we find transgressive as a culture. Nonetheless,
it would be possible to rewrite the Showtime series Queer as Folk to show anti-gay
sentiments and that would be fair use, just as the preacher’s story in which Harry Potter
realizes that magic is anti-Christian and gives up his wand to save his soul is fair use (even
though I think it is tripe). See Bill Keller, Harry Potter and the Search for a King, (Sept. 18,
2006), http://www.liveprayer.com/potter.cfm.
112. See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994)
(noting that “only traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets” are relevant to
market-effect analysis).
113. See Lord of the Rings: Secret Lovers? Not That There’s Anything Wrong With
That, TBS Broadband (2006), http://tbs.com/broadband/videoplayer/0,, 0636,00.html.
114. BROKEBACK MOUNTAIN (Focus Features 2005) (adapting E. Annie Proulx’s short
story about two homosexual cowboys).
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into discomfort with private censorship. Most owners of copyrights in
historical or contemporary literature are unlikely to authorize science
fiction versions. And there are separate market segments for science
fiction and for gay and lesbian literature—if the cases mean what they say,
either both should be cognizable markets for derivative works purposes or
neither. The difference, if any, is in the social meanings of homosexuality
and of science fiction.
More generally, the treatment of the market for sexualized works in
parody cases is fundamentally confused. Though the accused work itself, if
commercial, usually demonstrates that such a market exists, courts tend to
ignore it or at least ignore that there are creative works in that market.
Thus, the Court wrote in Campbell that “the market for potential derivative
uses includes only those that creators of original works would in general
develop or license others to develop.”115 Courts responded by finding that
copyright owners would not license sexually explicit versions of Barbie or
GWTW.116 Yet creators of original sexually explicit works routinely
develop successful series, from best-selling horror author Anne Rice
writing as A.N. Roquelaure to the several incarnations of Debbie Does
Dallas, now a musical as well as a film series. Pornographers are copyright
owners too. (And holders of other rights, as illustrated by a New York
Times report on celebrities who are willing to license distribution of their
private sex tapes as long as they are being paid.)117
Parody threatens to put a work into both the legitimate and the sexually
explicit markets at once, and, whether an accused work is found to be a fair
use or not, fair use doctrine works to preserve the separation by presuming
that no real copyright owner would have a presence in both.118 The
doctrine draws this bright line even though there is at least one class of
work that often exists in both markets: movies, which the studios edit for
television to decrease sexual content and also release as DVDs with unrated
footage as an extra feature, allowing increased sexual explicitness.119
115. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994).
116. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 793, 806 (9th Cir.
2003) (“Forsythe’s work could only reasonably substitute for a work in the market for adultoriented artistic photographs of Barbie. We think it safe to assume that Mattel will not enter
such a market or license others to do so.”).
117. See Lola Ogunnaike, Sex, Lawsuits, and Celebrities Caught on Tape, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 2006, at 9-1.
118. See Clean Flicks, LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F.2d 1236, 1238, 1240 (appealing to
artistic integrity by ruling for the movie studios’ rights to keep sex in their films, even while
acknowledging that studios routinely create multiple edits for various distribution channels
such as in-flight movies and broadcast television). The Clean Flicks court focused on the
sex- and violence-laden versions released in theaters as the authentic expression of creative
freedom. See id. at 1243.
119. Often the DVDs promise more on that front than they deliver. See Josh Levin, The
Naked Truth: A Slate Investigation Into Unrated DVDs, SLATE, Jan. 19, 2006,
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While the immediate battle over the right of third parties to edit movies to
make them more family-friendly was resolved, the conceptual problem
remains. Some copyright owners are perfectly willing to segment the
market, licensing parodies and other licentiousness along with more
traditional derivative works.120 DC Comics orders an art gallery to take
down paintings of Batman and Robin kissing,121 but introduces a lesbian
Batwoman with much fanfare.122
Even Barbie has an authorized
dominatrix side in her Catwoman guise contrary to the Pitt court’s
statement that “there is no Mattel line of ‘S & M’ Barbie:”123

Treating “explicit” and “mainstream” works as operating in entirely
different markets reinforces the special role of sexuality in evaluating the
first fair use factor. A sexualized work is presumptively transformative and
presumptively not the sort of thing a normal copyright owner is likely to
license, unlike everything else. With the first and fourth factors tilting in a
defendant’s favor, fair use inexorably follows.124
http://www.slate.com/id/2134503.
120. See Bruce P. Keller & Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic Than the Real Thing:
Parody Lawsuits Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 979, 995-97 (2004) (discussing examples
of copyright owner–licensed parodies such as “Weird Al” Yankovic’s songs); cf. Salil
Mehra, Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain Why All the Cartoons My Kid
Watches are Japanese Imports?, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 155, 195-96 n. 206 (2002) (discussing
instances in which unauthorized derivative works, especially sexually explicit works, have
been adopted as new genres by Japanese manga (comic book) publishers).
121. See Blample Sog, Lighten Up DC, http://popuppupop.blogspot.com/ 2005_08_01_
archive.html (Aug. 21, 2005).
122. See BBC NEWS, Batwoman Hero Returns as Lesbian (May 30, 2006), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/entertainment/5030518.stm.
123. Mattel, Inc. v. Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 315, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
124. See id.
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Were courts to accept the existence of multiple levels of authorized
explicitness, their current analysis of fair use might collapse. Perfect 10 v.
Google, Inc. concerned Google’s small “thumbnail” images of sexually
explicit pictures that were available at sites lacking authorization from the
copyright owner Perfect 10.125 A previous precedent, Kelly v. Arriba Soft
Corp., had determined that a search engine’s provision of thumbnail
images of non-sexual pictures as part of image search results was fair use.
126
Nonetheless, the Perfect 10 court rejected Google’s fair use defense
largely on the ground that Perfect 10, unlike Kelly and other copyright
owners, had successfully monetized the market for small, low-resolution
sexually explicit pictures delivered to subscribers’ cellphones.127 The
pornographer’s offer is always “I’ll sell you anything—any body, any act,”
so pornography is naturally at the forefront of universal licensing.
Notably, part of the Perfect 10 court’s analysis intimated that consumers
of sexually explicit images were less discriminating than consumers of
other images.128 They would get the same gratification from small
thumbnail images as from full-size images because they may “pay little
attention to fine details” when nude pictures are involved.129 At the same
time, the Perfect 10 court rejected two claims about the special status of
pictures of nude women: Google’s position that Perfect 10’s pictures were
not particularly creative for purposes of the second fair use factor because
they focused on nudes—essentially, they were masturbation aids rather
than creative art—and Perfect 10’s argument regarding the third factor that,
unlike other pictures, nudes could be easily described in words without the
need to copy the images themselves.130 Though it correctly rejected both
arguments, the court did not recognize that the two arguments were
fundamentally the same as the “inattentive browser” position it endorsed—
that the pictures were in important ways sex rather than images and should
not be analyzed as ordinary creative works. It remains to be seen whether a
court of appeals will agree that Perfect 10’s indiscriminate, voracious
licensing precludes Google’s fair use defense.
Another court confronted a case in which a sexually oriented work was

125. Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 831-34 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
126. 336 F.3d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 2003).
127. Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 851.
128. See id. at 847.
129. See id.; see also Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’n Corp., 354 F.3d 1020,
1028 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We presume that the average searcher seeking adult-oriented
materials on the Internet is easily diverted from a specific product he or she is seeking if
other options, particularly graphic ones, appear more quickly.”). Contrary to the courts’
intuitions, my own is that people are very specific about their sexual needs, such that they
will carefully seek out what they want, which may or may not include thumbnail images.
130. See Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 849-50.
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excerpted and repurposed for a more general audience. Sandy Kane owns
the copyright in The Sandy Kane Blew Comedy Show, which appears on
public access television.131 On that show, Ms. Kane, a former stripper and
comedienne, “sings, dances, and delivers explicit jokes while wearing little
to no clothing.”132 Comedy Central’s The Daily Show used a clip from
Kane’s show to introduce a segment called “Public Excess” about the weird
and silly things shown on public access channels.133 Kane’s show also
appeared as a subject of one “Public Excess” segment in which she was
dancing in a bikini while singing her signature song, I Love Dick.134 A
video clip also appeared in an ad for The Daily Show in which the clip
played while a voice-over declared The Daily Show “offensive.”135
Kane did not object to the ridicule, she simply wanted to be paid for the
use of the clips of her show. She argued that the defendant’s use harmed
her licensing market.136 The court rejected her argument, reasoning that it
posed insuperable problems of circularity; the defendant’s use would harm
her market if licensing was part of her legitimate market, but would not
present any harm to her market if the use was considered to be “fair use.”137
While this is certainly true, it is also true of every other case that takes
licensing into account, yet the dominant trend is to accept copyright
owners’ claims of willingness to license. The only way to prevent
circularity is to hold that certain licensing markets are not part of the
copyright owner’s entitlement, regardless of willingness to license.138
Just as it has affected assessments of transformativeness, sex has
profoundly shaped courts’ evaluations of copyright owners’ legitimate
markets. Catering to a minority is either the right of the copyright owner,
to be exercised or not depending on its choice (Clean Flicks), or the right of
the fair user (Starballz). The outcome turns on the degree of sexual
explicitness the minority prefers. The movie studios have the right to
license bowdlerized versions but not a monopoly on exaggeratedly sexual
versions. The flip side is that the pornographer in Perfect 10, willing to
license anything, gets all the rights.
131. Kane v. Comedy Partners, No. 00 Civ. 158 (GBD), 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18513, at
*1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2003).
132. Id. at *2.
133. Id. at *2-3.
134. Id. at *4.
135. Id. at *3-4.
136. Id. at *16-18.
137. Id. at *17-18.
138. See Gideon Parchomovsky, Fair Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice, 3 LEGAL
THEORY 347, 359-60 (1997) (pointing out that the ability to charge for a use no more gives a
copyright owner a right to charge than a gangster’s ability to extort money does; one needs a
normative theory about why a right to charge is justified).
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Regardless of the ultimate resolution in Perfect 10 and Clean Flicks, it is
likely that sexual content will remain important in fair use market analysis.
Despite changes in copyright owners’ behavior and in the general
acceptability of sexual material, courts will continue to interrupt the
circularity of market analysis by drawing a line between sexually explicit
and non-explicit works, such that rights in a work do not extend to
licensing more explicit derivative works. By refusing to allow the market
for smut to merge into the rest of the market for expression, copyright law
helps preserve the historical separation between sex and other more
socially valued subjects.
B. The Gender of Commercial Use
Copyright law operates under the assumption that commercial, profitseeking uses are the core of creative production, the standard by which the
value and effectiveness of copyright law is judged. In fact, noncommercial
production is also everywhere, though legal academics are just beginning
to theorize its pervasiveness and its relations to commercial production.139
Campbell justified protecting commercial transformative uses with the
quote, “No man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money.”140 No
man. Most transformative uses that get litigated, like the song at issue in
Campbell, are commercial because that is where the money is and
defendants making noncommercial uses rarely can afford or find legal
representation. If commercial uses, no matter how transformative, were
presumptively unfair, then there would be almost no judicially recognized
fair use. The Court therefore had to minimize the relevance of commercial
motive in order to reach a desirable result, but it did so by denigrating
noncommercial production. The problem with this rationale from a
feminist perspective is that noncommercial, non-market artistic production
turns out to be what women do.141 Women’s freely offered creations are
139. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 117 (2006) (“Social production of goods and
services, both public and private, is ubiquitous, though unnoticed. It sometimes substitutes
for, and sometimes complements, market and state production everywhere. It is . . . the dark
matter of our economic production universe.”); see also Francesca Coppa, Writing Bodies in
Space: Media Fan Fiction as Theatrical Performance, in FAN FICTION AND FAN
COMMUNITIES IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET 225, 236-37 (Karen Hellekson & Kristina Busse
eds., 2006) (maintaining that although noncommercial production has a pedigree as long as
human history, the category of “amateur” noncommercial production only makes sense in
contrast to modern industrialized production of mass culture).
140. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (quoting JAMES
BOSWELL, 3 BOSWELL’S LIFE OF JOHNSON 19 (George Hill ed., 1934)).
141. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 97, at 657 n.23 (discussing female-dominated
production of noncommercial fan fiction); Shelley Wright, A Feminist Exploration of the
Legal Protection of Art, 7 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 59, 61–64 (1994) (describing classifications
which distinguish between high art, which is more likely to be produced by a man, and
crafts, which tend to be created by women).
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invisible—or, possibly worse, blockheaded.142
Nonetheless, hundreds of thousands of noncommercial, unauthorized
derivative works exist. For example, “slash” is the term for fan fiction,
unauthorized derivative works based on popular media properties like Star
Trek and Harry Potter, that features homosexual, usually male,
relationships.143 Women are the major producers and consumers of slash,
which is often distributed freely and thus entirely noncommercially on the
Internet.144 This noncommerciality, in turn, is one characteristic that
outsiders use to dismiss the genre as irrelevant, silly, or otherwise
unworthy.145
Fan fiction offers hundreds, even thousands, of versions of the same
story—how Harry Potter and Hermione Granger finally got together, or
how Harry and Draco Malfoy did.146 Fan fiction’s abundance, even
overabundance, is anti-market in many respects. Along with its free
circulation, its very premise that the same characters can be used again and
again defies concepts of exhaustion and the tragedy of the commons.
Exploitation of popular characters like Harry Potter, Superman, and Dana
Scully can be incredibly intensive. No one person could read all the Harry
Potter or Lord of the Rings fan fiction already in existence, and yet people

142. See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk
Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 140-41 (1998) (arguing that
we often do not notice limited common property regimes, which can include regimes
relating to intellectual property, because they are run by people “somehow deemed
inappropriate to make claims of entitlement,” like women). Disvalued groups’ properties
are deemed improper by those in power, and “unconventional communal claims and
unrecognized social status” combine to defeat outsiders’ recognition of a property regime.
Id. at 141.
143. See Sonia Katyal, Performance, Property, and the Slashing of Gender in Fan
Fiction, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 463, 470 (2006).
144. See id. at 471.
145. See Coppa, supra note 137, at 227-28 (“Few fan fiction writers will ever have
access to the means of production for mass media storytelling. The bar is much higher; the
funds needed are enormous; one still has to move to Los Angeles or Vancouver; the odds of
writing a show you like, as opposed to one you’re assigned to, are small; until relatively
recently, the gender bias in Hollywood was astounding. There is, in short, a very small
chance of a fan fiction writer becoming a professional mass media storyteller, even if she
was inclined to do so. Defiant amateurism in this case is both realistic and structurally
smart, but that doesn’t stop some science fiction fans scoffing at the media fan’s refusal to
write something potentially salable.”). Coppa notes that fan fiction suffers in the minds of
both outsiders and insiders from being “neither art nor commerce.” Id. at 229. Cultural
authorities do not consider fan fiction “art” because it is repetitive and character focused,
not plot or idea based, and not commerce because it is, definitionally, excluded from
markets. Seeing fan fiction as performance, like multiple iterations of the same Shakespeare
play, helps us understand its artistic merits, but it does not move fan fiction any further up
the market/non-market or amateur/professional hierarchies.
146. See Kristina Busse, Rowling’s Ghost Effect: Reading and Authority in Harry Potter
Fanfiction 2 (June 15, 2005) (unpublished essay, on file with author) (discussing the diverse
pairings that may occur in a fan fiction community).
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keep producing and reading it.147 Stories, unlike computer code, can “fork”
without destroying the communities built around them.148
Fan artists are appropriating male images for their own uses, making
men’s bodies public the way women’s bodies have been, telling overtly
sexualized stories, and confounding gender norms. If rewriting Roy
Orbison’s description of a woman to make it blatantly disparaging and
sexual is transformative, rewriting mass media texts about men to
foreground their sexuality (and make that sexuality queer) should also be
transformative.149 That is simple equality, as in the following image of a
mock comic book cover that treats Superman’s body the way Wonder
Woman’s body is routinely treated in the authorized versions:150

147. See id. at 10.
148. See id. at 14-15; Dennis S. Karjala, Congestion Externalities and Extended
Copyright Protection, 94 Geo. L.J. 1065, 1084-85 (2006) (refuting the “tragedy of the
commons” argument with respect to popular characters generally).
149. See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Right to Mary Sue, 95 CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 18, on file with the American University Journal of
Gender, Social Policy & the Law) (analyzing The Wind Done Gone as a type of liberatory
fan fiction).
150. Posting of Karen to Like Scratches in the Sand, http://odditycollector.
livejournal.com/97166.html (Apr. 19, 2006, 20:34 UTC). Unlike the Batman/Robin kiss,
DC Comics does not appear to have taken any action against this work.
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However, attaining equality may not be as simple as doing to images of
men what men have done to images of women. As the responses to this
parody cover revealed, many women are interested in looking at male
bodies, but the image can also be read as fetishization of body parts for an
imagined male, now homosexual, gaze.151 Even if this look at Superman’s
body helps balance the scales of representational justice, formal equality, as
feminists have long emphasized, is not enough.152
Meanwhile,
enforcement against noncommercial speech proceeds apace because most
recipients of cease and desist letters lack the money and legal knowledge to
resist—another way in which formal doctrinal equality is insufficient to
produce equal freedom for male and female patterns of creation.153
Along with regulating market relations, sex and gender factor into
controlling protest, resistance, and disobedience in intellectual property.
Fan fiction writers, who are mostly women, are less likely to go public and
more likely to accept the idea that they should stay under the radar. When
female fans write sexually explicit stories, publicly acknowledging their
authorship (and thus, implicitly, their own sexual desires and fantasies)
would be embarrassing and, for those with conservative families or
communities, potentially devastating. Therefore, they cannot generally
afford to risk exposure. They use pseudonyms and restrict access to their
web sites so as not to attract too much attention, self-limiting the liberatory
possibilities of their work.154
Low-protectionists, a group of which I count myself a part, often argue
that many people will create art even without legal protection because of
the intrinsic, reputational, and other non-copyright rewards for creativity.155
Empirically, this is true. Nonetheless, when we compare fields that get
intellectual property protection (software, sculpture) with fields that do not
(fashion, cooking, sewing), it becomes uncomfortably obvious that our
cultural policy has expected women’s endeavors to generate surplus
151. See, e.g., Posting of Anonymous to Like Scratches in the Sand, http://
odditycollector.livejournal.com/97166.html?thread=584334#t584334 (May 15, 2006, 19:01
UTC) (concluding that sexual images of women appeal to the masses, while those of men
attract homosexual men); Posting of Anonymous to Like Scratches in the Sand,
http://odditycollector.livejournal.com/97166.html?thread=597390#t 597390 (May 18, 2006,
06:58 UTC) (remarking that comic art derives from the unfulfilled homoerotic fantasies of
authors and audiences).
152. Appropriating male bodies and turning them into objects of fantasy and raw
material for appropriation, critique, and transformation, as slash fan fiction does, can be
liberating for women but may not always be welcomed by the objects of such fantasy and
may not translate into support for actual gay and lesbian causes.
153. See MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE? FREE
EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL 4 (2005).
154. Cf. Katyal, supra note 143, at 480-81 (discussing the role of anonymity in enabling
fan fiction as long as it stays anonymous).
155. See Tushnet, supra note 97, at 685-86.
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creativity but has assumed that men’s endeavors require compensation, just
as our society has expected women to do the hard work of raising children
and keeping house out of love and duty but has not expected men to show
up at the factory for the same reasons.156 Copyright’s economic focus and
the expense of litigation will systematically lead to case law undervaluing
non-market production, including historically female creative practices.
It does not seem likely that society at large will soon honor women’s
creativity, particularly slash fan fiction, with the same indulgence and
affection reserved for men’s pastimes, such as fantasy baseball.
Nonetheless, it is worth talking about these practices, if only to point out
that even apparently neutral laws, far from the contested realms of family
law and substantive due process, are entangled in ideas about gender and
sexuality.
IV. CONCLUSION: FAINT HEART NEVER WON FAIR USE
At a time when fair use is under attack by copyright owners’ ever-greater
assertions of rights and courts seem willing to find viable markets in all
sorts of new places, it may seem dangerous to suggest that lowprotectionists’ favorite fair use decisions contain deeply problematic
gendered reasoning. It would be a mistake, however, to stay silent about
the way sex works in so many prominent fair use cases. Copyright is not
the only thing that counts, and criticizing a woman’s body should not be
the prototypical fair use.
Instead, fair use should have many prototypes, commercial and
noncommercial, published and unpublished, transformations of all kinds, as
well as some pure copying. A feminist insistence on heterogeneity and on
the rejection of binaries that allow fair use only when the use is most
blatantly opposed to the original157 would improve the doctrine.
Both copyright cases and the works they analyze express ideas about
gender and sexuality, and that deserves our attention. Fair use, like love, is
a wonderful thing, but it is not above reproach.

156. Cf. Séverine Dusollier, The Master’s Tools v. The Master’s House: Creative
Commons and Copyright, 29 COLUMBIA J.L. & ARTS 271, 287-88 (2006) (comparing the
Creative Commons attempt to promote an ideology in which creators freely give to
consumers to gendered systems of labor that require women to perform intimate services for
free).
157. See Katyal, supra note 143, at 498 (describing the lack of protection that exists for
works that do not oppose or build upon an original work).
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